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Panel III: Restricting Speech on the
Internet: Finding an Appropriate
Regulatory Framework
Moderator:
Panelists:

Andrew B. Sims*
Parry Aftab, Esq.**
Lisa M. Fantino, Esq.***
Richard A. Kurnit, Esq.****
Robert W. Peters, Esq.*****
Barry Steinhardt, Esq.******

MR. SIMS: Good afternoon. I am Professor Andrew Sims.
Our third panel of this symposium is entitled Restricting Speech on
the Internet: Finding an Appropriate Regulatory Framework. We
have some fabulous and very knowledgeable panelists for you to
enjoy.
Our first speaker is Richard Kurnit, a partner in the law firm of
Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz. He has discussed the regulation
of pornography on the Internet at other symposia,1 and he repre* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York,
N.Y. Amherst College, B.A. 1970; Harvard Law School, J.D. 1973.
** Partner, Aftab & Savitt, P.C., Paramus, N.J. Hunter College, B.A. 1981; New
York University School of Law, J.D. 1984.
*** Reporter/Writer, WCBS-AM Radio, New York, N.Y. Pace University, B.A.;
Syracuse University, S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, M.S. 1983; Pace
University School of Law, J.D. 1997.
**** Partner, Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz, P.C., New York, N.Y.; Member of
Faculty (Advertising Law), Parsons School of Design. Columbia College, A.B., magna
cum laude, 1972; Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1975.
***** President, Morality in Media, Inc., New York, N.Y. Dartmouth College,
B.A., cum laude, 1971; New York University School of Law, J.D. 1975.
****** President, Electronic Frontier Foundation, New York, N.Y.; Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y. (1990-1998). Goddard College,
B.A. 1975; Northeastern University School of Law, J.D. 1978.
1. See Mike Godwin, Richard A. Kurnit, et al., Regulating the Internet: Should Por-
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sented Prodigy in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co..2
Following Mr. Kurnit, Lisa Fantino will give her remarks. She is a
reporter and writer for the CBS’s flagship radio station: WCBSAM in New York City. Ms. Fantino will be followed by Barry
Steinhardt, who chaired the Cyber Liberties Task Force for the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and has been very active in coordinating the ACLU’s campaigns to keep cyberspace
free from censorship. You also will hear from Robert Peters,
president of Morality in Media. In that capacity, he works to combat illegal hard-core pornography and uphold decency standards in
the media. Parry Aftab will be our final speaker this afternoon.
She is a well-known attorney who has written extensively on cyberspace and technology law, including the recently published
book A Parent’s Guide to the Internet: How to Protect Your Children in Cyberspace.3
Each panelist will speak for several minutes on the issue. After
all of the panelists have presented, we will have a roundtable discussion and open the floor for questions from the audience. Thank
you and I would like to present Rick Kurnit.
MR. KURNIT: As a starting point to a discussion of regulation
of the World Wide Web we must understand that it is not like the
Wild West.4 The rule of law is very much available to those who
venture onto the Internet. The issue is not how to regulate, but
whether to add regulations to the existing body of laws: criminal
as well as private rights of action that already are in place. To the
extent that there is frustration about lawless activity, it is the difficulty of apprehending culprits in an anonymous and free floating
environment and the fact that, with no cost or barrier to entry into
the marketplace, the culprits are often judgment proof. More regulation will not answer those problems. Nevertheless, it is ill adnography Get a Free Ride on the Information Superhighway? A Panel Discussion, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343 (1996).
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
3. PARRY AFTAB, A PARENT’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR
CHILDREN IN CYBERSPACE (1997).
4. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista, 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997);
Nicholas W. Allard & David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Washington Report, 59 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 569 (1997).
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vised to succumb to the impulse to hold liable the more or less innocent bystanders who have the means to pay a judgment.
Let us look at the private rights of action that already regulate
the content of the Internet and the degree to which they reach the
on-line service provider or other responsible parties. On-line material may give rise to all of the potential liability faced by conventional publishers and advertisers. These include copyright, trademark, publicity rights, privacy rights, and defamation.
All existing copyright protections are applicable to the Internet.5 There is not likely to be any significant exception carved out
of the law of copyright infringement in order to facilitate the new
media. Thus, there is a very real risk of being held liable as a contributory infringer even where you have not originated the offending material.6 All that is necessary to establish liability for contributing to infringement by another is knowledge of the copyright
infringement and significant help or assistance.7 Therefore, merely
providing the server into which the infringing material is stored
and facilitating transmission to others may be sufficient assistance,
requiring only proof of knowledge of the infringing nature of the
material to establish liability.8 Thus, in the few cases decided to
date on this issue, courts have held that the operators of computer
networks can be held liable for acts of copyright infringement by
users of the networks, even when the operators do not participate
in the acts of infringement or intend to infringe copyright.9
In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena,10 the defendant was the operator of a subscription computer bulletin board service (“BBS”),
accessible via telephone modem to customers.11 The BBS included unauthorized copies of 170 photographs, in which the plaintiff Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (“Playboy”) owned the copyright, up5. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 107 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998); see also Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
6. See Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
7. See id. at 514.
8. See Religious Tech., 923 F. Supp. at 1231.
9. See Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
10. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
11. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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loaded by customers from their home computers.12 Customers of
the BBS could browse and download the computerized copies of
the photographs and store the copied image from the host computer
in their home computer.13
Although the defendant in Playboy stated that he never himself
uploaded or downloaded the copyrighted photographs, and removed the unauthorized copies from the BBS as soon as he was
sued by Playboy, the court nonetheless held him liable for copyright infringement.14 The display of the copyrighted photographs
over the computer network constituted “public distribution” of the
photographs and therefore infringement of Playboy’s exclusive
right, as the copyright owner, to distribution.15
In Sega Enterprises v. Maphia,16 the court held the operators of
a BBS, whose customers could also upload and download material
between the host computer and their own computers, liable for
copyright infringement.17 The BBS in Sega contained unauthorized copies of plaintiff Sega Enterprises’ (“Sega”) copyrighted
video games, which were uploaded and downloaded by customers
of the BBS.18 There was evidence that the defendants encouraged
and even solicited customers to download games, and charged fees
for downloading privileges or required customers to upload games
in exchange for downloading other games.19 Consequently, the defendants directly profited from the infringement. The court held
that the unauthorized copying of the video games, that is, uploading and downloading the games, by customers was copyright infringement and that Sega’s role in the copying—including provision of facilities, direction, knowledge, and encouragement—
constituted contributory copyright infringement.20 The court found
it was irrelevant that the defendants did not know exactly when the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1556-57.
857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 687.
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programs would be uploaded or downloaded by customers.21
Given the unsettled state of the law, we generally recommend
that to reduce exposure, wherever appropriate take steps to ensure
downloading of files is difficult or impossible and include an online copyright notice.22 A claim of infringement of another’s copyrighted work may lead to an award of damages as well as attorneys
fees.23 It is the copyright owner’s option to collect either actual
damages, which in this context would be difficult for a plaintiff to
prove, or statutory damages, that is, damages fixed by statute in the
range of $200 to $100,000 per infringement.24
Generally, courts award statutory damages in the lower portion
of this range for innocent infringers.25 The higher amounts are
awarded only in exceptional cases involving willful infringers.26
Willfulness requires an alleged infringer’s knowledge that certain
conduct is infringing.27 Because it is unlikely that a copyright
owner will be able to prove substantial actual damages from customers’ infringement, your precautionary measures can influence a
court to view you as, at most, an innocent infringer, hence liable
only for statutory damages at the lower end of this range.
Now, on to trademarks. The Lanham Act prohibits the use of
another’s trademark, symbol, or name in a way that falsely suggests the affiliation, connection, association, or sponsorship by that
person of the alleged infringer’s goods or services.28 Specifically,
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes liability on the infringer.29
21. Id. at 686-87.
22. See generally Mary Ann Shulman, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability; Is
an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator, 27 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 555, 596-600 (1997) (discussing online access provider liability).
23. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
24. See id. § 504.
25. Cf. Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
trial courts take innocence into account when fixing statutory damages because they are
“equitable in nature”).
26. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1995); Peer
Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336-1337 (9th Cir. 1990).
27. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1010-11; Peer Int’l, 909 F.2d at 1336 n.3.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
29. Section 43(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
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Generally, liability under the Lanham Act will arise from the
use of others’ trademarks, symbols, or names in a manner that
falsely or misleadingly suggests that the owner of the mark sponsors or otherwise is associated with your goods or services.30
Thus, if others’ trademarks are used in a manner that may suggest
a tie-in, it is advisable to get permission from the trademark owner.
It is also advisable to use other entities’ trademarks in their full and
proper form, not distorted or manipulated in any way, in order to
avoid claims based on dilution of trademarks.31
To be held liable for contributory infringement, you must be
found to “knowingly cooperate in illegal and tortious activity.”32
Therefore, although it is unlikely that customers will infringe the
trademarks of others in the context of a chat service or bulletin
board, if you are aware of such an infringement and you do not delete the infringing material, you may be held liable for your customers’ trademark infringement.33 In the event of a claim of this
nature, you could take the position that given the volume of materials that appear in a chat service or on a bulletin board, you could
not have known of or prevented any trademark infringement.34 If,
however, a determination is made to monitor chat services and bulletin boards for other purposes—such as obscenity, racial epithets,
defamation, or copyright infringement—and in the process you
gain knowledge of materials which infringe the trademarks of othtainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act.
Id.
30. See Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
31. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1996).
32. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25.02 (4th ed. 1997).
33. See Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-15 (N.D.
Ohio 1997); Sega Enters., 857 F. Supp. at 686-87; Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
34. See Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 509-10.
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ers, you risk liability for contributory infringement.35
Now, on to the right of publicity. The right of publicity permits anyone to sue for unauthorized use of his or her name or likeness in advertising.36 But the First Amendment limits the extent to
which state law claims for violation of the rights of publicity and
privacy can be based on the use of a name or likeness in connection with information, news, and other editorial content.37 Thus,
state statute and common law requirements for permission to use a
person’s name or likeness are generally limited to use for trade and
advertising.38
Advertising is basically defined as a communication whose
principal purpose is to propose an economic transaction.39 Editorial content is traditionally defined in terms of the control exercised
by the editorial staff of the publication.40 Alternatively, the distinction is made between a paid media insertion, namely, an advertisement, and the content of the publication which is generated by
the staff of the publication or by freelance writers who are paid for
the right to include their material in the publication. A conventional magazine contains editorial content, in which permission to
use a person’s name or likeness is not necessary, side by side with
advertising where the use of a name or likeness must be with permission. The same principles apply to electronic media.41
A New York court addressed this issue in electronic media in
Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp.,42 which concerned adver-

35. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)); Gershwin
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
36. See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 63 N.Y.2d 379 (1984).
37. See Zaccini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. See Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699-700 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995).
39. See id. at 696, 701
40. See id. at 698.
41. See id. at 698-699 (“Because Stern’s name was used by Delphi to elicit public
debate on Stern’s candidacy, logically subsequent use of Stern’s name and likeness in the
advertisement is afforded the same protection as would be a more traditional news disseminator engaged in the advertisement of a newsworthy product.”).
42. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1995).
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tising by an on-line service for one of its chat lines.43 The chat line
concerned Howard Stern (“Stern”), a talk-show personality who
was running for Governor of New York at that time.44 The court
held that this advertising was incidental to the editorial content of
the on-line service, hence it was permissible under New York
law.45
The key holding is the determination that the chat line itself,
which permitted subscribers to use Stern’s name in discussing
Stern and his candidacy, was editorial content fully protected by
the First Amendment.46 The court, citing the leading case that
deals with on-line services, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,47
agreed that an on-line service, even one where only paid subscribers may access the information services, is like a book store or a
letter to the editor column in a newspaper.48 No permission is necessary to use the name of an individual in connection with such
material.49 This of course goes to the chat service aspect of the defendant’s service as opposed to a web site’s editorial material, but
a publisher’s own editorial material is certainly entitled to the same
protection as the letters to the editor.50
There is one case recognizing that the news and information
aspects of on-line services are entitled to the same protection as
newspapers.51 Courts have gone pretty far in holding that just
about any information is entitled to this protection. Perhaps the
most dramatic instance involved a holding in which the court
found that pictures illustrating a book entitled World Guide To
43. Id. at 695.
44. See id. at 695-696.
45. Id. at 697-698.
46. See id. at 701 (stating that “affording protection to on-line computers services
when they are engaged in traditional news dissemination . . . is the desirable and required
result”).
47. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
48. Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
49. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140 (“A computerized database is the functional
equivalent of a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor . . . than that which is applied to a
public library, book store or news stand would impose an undue burden on the free flow
of information.”).
50. See id.; Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
51. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
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Nude Beaches constituted newsworthy matters of public interest
and prohibited any claim for invasion of privacy.52 Thus, the editorial material contained on-line, including chat lines, should be
entitled to the same protection as the editorial content of a magazine.
The key issue would be to distinguish the advertising material
from the editorial material. Just as a magazine contains articles of
public interest next to advertisements so might a web site. The
challenge here is to keep the advertising messages separate from
the editorial content. Thus, even “advertorial” sections included in
a magazine are deemed to include advertising and articles, although the articles are clearly approved by the advertiser or the
sponsor of the “advertorial” as being conducive to the advertising
they wish to attract. The reader’s ability to distinguish articles
from advertisements is crucial.53
In the leading case, New York Magazine had a feature each
week called Best Bets, which featured items available for sale including the store location and the price.54 The New York Court of
Appeals held that it was editorial material under the control of the
editors of the magazine and not an advertisement in disguise, thus
defeating the claim by a model who was wearing a jacket depicted
in such an announcement.55 Therefore, under New York law, even
an article about a product that extols the virtues of the product may
be treated as an editorial and not an advertisement, where the material is not a paid media insertion or otherwise under the control of
the manufacturer or the entity proposing a commercial transaction.56
A World Wide Web site that constantly and conspicuously depicts the logo of the sponsor may be viewed as being more like an
infomercial than a typical medium of communication which contains editorial material and separate advertising material. Consequently, in developing such a web site, it is important to think
52. See Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220-221 (App. Div.
1985) (prohibiting a claim for invasion of privacy).
53. See Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
54. See Stephano v. Newsgroup Publication, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 582 (N.Y. 1984).
55. Id. at 585.
56. See id. at 585-86.
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about the overall means of distinguishing the editorial content from
the advertising message. Specifically, a web site developer should
plan how to present logos, plugs, and commercial messages in order to avoid blurring the distinction between the editorial substance
and the advertising messages. It is also important to develop the
means for prohibiting advertising from bulletin boards and chat
lines.
Now, on to defamation. Generally, defamation is the oral or
written publication to third parties57 of a false statement of fact
about a person or business that causes the person or business to
suffer reputational injury.58 Ordinarily, “one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he
had originally published it.”59 In the context of libel, which are
written as opposed to spoken defamatory statements, courts have
traditionally distinguished between most distributors of materials
containing defamatory material and publishers.60 “[Most] courts
have long held that vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of
the defamation.”61 This requirement that a distributor have knowledge of the defamation is rooted in the guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press contained in the First Amendment.62
Sponsorship or operation of a chat service or bulletin board
service raises significant, and as yet unresolved, issues of liability
under defamation law. Because the very purpose of chat and bulletin board services is to permit customers to post messages and engage in dialogue,63 as in the Playboy Enterprises v. Frena64 action,
57. That is, parties other than the person making the defamatory statement, or the
person or entity that is the subject of the defamatory statement.
58. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
59. Cianci v. New York Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. See id.; see also Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139 (quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521
F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
62. See id.
63. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law; Indecency on the Internet: Constitutionality of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 463, 505 (1997) (discussing chat room services); Niva El Kin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Su-
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customers might commit acts of copyright infringement in posting
messages, or in uploading material on-line.65 Thus, you may wish
to monitor or screen the services for copyright and trademark infringement issues and delete infringing material. You may also
wish to (1) monitor the services for obscenity, racial epithets, and
the like, (2) delete offensive material, and (3) prevent users from
interfering with operation of the service or from harassing other
users. This very monitoring, however, might expose you to liability for defamation.66
Two decisions addressed whether the operator of a bulletin
board or chat service is a distributor as opposed to a publisher—
both suggesting that the degree of editorial control exercised by the
operator will be the determinative factor. In Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc.,67 the defendant CompuServe, Inc. (“CompuServe”) contracted with a company not affiliated with CompuServe, to “manage, review, create, delete and otherwise control the
contents of its Journalism Forum68 in accordance with editorial and
technical standards and conventions of style as established by
CompuServe.”69 The court found CompuServe to be in the position of a distributor, rather than a publisher, and therefore not liperhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346, 347 n.5 (1993) (defining bulletin boards and their use).
64. 982 F. Supp. 503 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
65. See Kin-Koren, supra note 63 (discussing potential liability for uploading and
downloading material online); see also John F. Delaney & Adam Lichstein, The Law of
the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Case Law and Legal Developments, 505
PLI/PAT. 79, 94 (1998) (discussing Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal.
1996)).
66. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). The court held that service monitors who choose
to monitor and edit the content of their services should be viewed as publishers rather
than distributors and thus should be subject to greater liability. Id. Congress voiced its
displeasure with the decision by passing the Communications Decency Act, which removed disincentives for Internet service providers who choose to police themselves. See
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No 105-165, Mar. 20,
1998); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the swift legislative response to the decision in Stratton Oakmont).
67. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
68. CompuServe’s on-line services include a series of forums that serve the needs of
specific user groups by providing bulletin boards, computer file libraries, and other services.
69. Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
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able for republication of defamatory statements unless it knew or
had reason to know of the defamation.70 Once CompuServe decided to carry a publication, it had little or no editorial control over
that publication’s contents, particularly when the publication was
carried as part of a forum managed by a company unrelated to
CompuServe.71
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,72 the court
found the defendant Prodigy Services Co. (“Prodigy”) was a publisher and could be held liable for republication of a defamatory
statement, even without knowledge or reason to know the statement was defamatory.73 The critical difference between CompuServe and Prodigy, and the reason behind the court’s determination
that Prodigy was a publisher, rather than a mere distributor, was
that Prodigy had undertaken to monitor the bulletin board service.74 The court relied on the following evidence to hold that
Prodigy was a publisher.
First, the court relied on the fact that Prodigy promulgated
“content guidelines” which requested users to refrain from posting
“insulting” or “harassing” notes or those that were in “bad taste” or
“grossly repugnant to community standards” or “harmful to maintaining a harmonious on-line community.”75 Prodigy stated it
would remove such messages when they were brought to Prodigy’s
attention.76 Second, the court relied on Prodigy’s use of screening
software that automatically pre-screened all bulletin board postings
for offensive language.77 Third, Prodigy’s use of Board Leaders
to, among other things, enforce the content guidelines was noted
by the court.78 And finally, the court acknowledged the use of an
“emergency delete function,” which enabled a Board Leader to
remove a message posted and send to the message poster a notice

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 141.
See id. at 140.
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
Id. at *6.
See id. at *10.
Id. at *5.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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of explanation, ranging from solicitation to bad taste to insulting.79
My firm was retained by Prodigy following this decision. We
moved for renewal and reargument in order to correct the factual
record. Prodigy in fact did not edit the bulletin board as the plaintiff claimed. Prodigy’s policing was limited to mechanical screening of obscenity and offensive words and, after material was
posted, the policing of off-topic postings and illegal conduct, such
as harassment and obstruction of the functioning of the bulletin
board.
We contended that this limited policing is not tantamount to
editing.80 We argued that a publisher, for purposes of liability for
defamation, must include the adoption or endorsement of an author’s statement. It is the reader’s assumption that the publisher
elected to publish the specific statement that contributes to the injury. It is the opportunity to evaluate an author’s statements and
the author’s reliability that gives a true publisher the chance to
avoid the injury. Thus, without the suggestion of adoption or endorsement or the practical opportunity to evaluate the substance of
the statement or the author’s reliability, there is no publisher for
purposes of defamation liability. Therefore, the operator of a bulletin board service should not be subject to liability for defamation
merely because that operator policed illegal conduct, obscenity,
fighting words, “time, place, and manner,” but not the substantive
content, that is, the truth or falsity of statements.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996,81 which contained provisions attempting to address indecency on the Internet,82 also contained a provision intended to override Stratton Oakmont.83 In
what has been called the “Good Samaritan Defense,” it provides
that actions taken by providers of Internet services to police inde-

79. Id. at *6.
80. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
81. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at scattered sections
of 15 & 47 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)).
82. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, tit. V, 110
Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 230, 560-561 (West 1998 & Supp.
1998)).
83. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c).
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cent, violent, or otherwise objectionable material cannot be considered in determining whether a provider is liable as a publisher for
information that was put up on their system by others.84 The cases
since the statute was enacted appear to suggest that it will work to
minimize the tendency to hold liable those you can apprehend for
the wrongful acts of others.85
Now, on to fraud and false advertising. The Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) had made absolutely clear that the full force
of laws prohibiting false advertising and fraud is applicable to the
Internet. Numerous actions have been instituted against the worst
offenders and this activity will only increase as commerce on the
Internet becomes increasingly significant.
As to indecency. Other panel members will address the subject
of pornography and sex, the one area where commerce on the
Internet has flourished most. But allow me one observation; the
White House has recognized that, given the worldwide scope of
the web, governmental regulation must be international to be truly
effective. Given this additional reality, what can be gained by adding governmental oversight to the individual control, responsibility, and enforcement of rights that the law already provides?
Given the rapidly changing technology, the ever-increasing capability of users to control what is in fact accessed, and the slow pace
of the legislative process, any proposals for additional regulations
or laws must be scrutinized in terms of real benefit. We must be
careful not to enact legislation merely because of frustration arising from the reality that this technology makes publishers, as opposed to pamphleteers, out of individuals who may be difficult to
locate, let alone hold accountable.
MR. SIMS: Thank you. Ms. Fantino is next.
MS. FANTINO: I come to this discussion wearing many hats:
former schoolteacher, veteran journalist, and newly admitted attorney. Instructing children, informing adults, and defending rights
are tenets I live by, and I do not believe they should suffer at the
expense of the First Amendment in cyberspace. Our forefathers
seem to have been more enlightened more than two hundred years
84. See id.
85. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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ago at guarding our liberty to speak freely in whatever form than
today’s legislators, who are hesitant to take baby-steps in adapting
to new technology as it leaps past them.
It is the dawn of a new millennium and today’s adults are giving birth to the leaders of the next century, all converging in a onewire world, where your television is not only your source of entertainment but it’s also your computer monitor, Internet connection,
pager, and telephone. It is communications on a global, even galactic scale, considering that we can now talk to space shuttle astronauts orbiting the Earth through the Internet. The Internet has
become a weapon of mass instruction and it would be a mistake to
silence its influence in a world that is trying to promote democracy, especially when there are already numerous legislative and
technological safeguards in place.
Right now, the United States is the lone superpower and the
world is looking to us, as the standard-bearer of free speech, to see
how we handle the Internet. If we were to place restrictions on
what can and cannot be said over the Internet, what kind of message would that send to repressive governments such as China,
which prohibits the importation of modems and satellite dishes?86
We are fortunate in that we only have to run down to our local Radio Shack store or electronics chain to buy this equipment.
The Internet was developed thirty years ago under the auspices
of the United States Defense Department in an effort to allow
computer and science experts to share experiences, ideas, and discoveries in a high-tech communications world.87 It was designed
to outlast a nuclear holocaust to enable the free flow of information
to continue.88 It has since expanded into a commercial vehicle
where anyone can log onto the World Wide Web.89 The implications of such a universal communications tool are overwhelming.
Interestingly enough, the government that gave birth to the Internet
86. See Scott E. Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: China’s Great Wall,
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 361.
87. See Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the Borders
of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173,
188 (1997).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 188-89
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is now trying to bridle its wild child, where, it has been said, anarchy reigns.90
While Congress recognizes the international scope of the Internet and other interactive computer services as providing a unique
opportunity for cultural and intellectual exchanges in addition to
avenues for political discourse,91 it is trying to control what can be
said between adults who take affirmative steps to use such services, generally within the confines of their own homes. Yet the
first congressional effort to reign in the masses through the Communications Decency Act92 failed with a resounding dismissal by
the Supreme Court, which saw the statute as an overly broad attempt to censor indecent speech.93
Free speech in the United States has become more of a protected speech than the unbridled ability to say whatever whenever.
While the framers of the Constitution were intent on promoting the
free marketplace of ideas through the guaranteed liberty of all
United States citizens to express themselves,94 judicial interpretation has modified the plain language of the First Amendment over
the course of time. The United States Supreme Court has limited
certain forms of speech to time, place, and manner restrictions,
while prohibiting Congress from imposing content-based regulations that impede that freedom.95 The Communications Decency
Act of 1996,96—part of the larger Telecommunications Act of
199697—was an unconstitutional expansion of federal authority,
abridging what has been deemed a fundamental personal right.98

90. See Robert F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There’s a Chill on the
Internet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1996).
91. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 86 (1996).
92. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
93. See Reno v. ACLU, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
94. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 93 (1984).
95. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992).
96. Pub. L No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 230, 560-561 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at scattered sections
of 15 & 47 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)).
98. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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Congress overreached in the Communications Decency Act by
attempting to suppress free expression under the guise of preventing child exploitation through computers, which is an act already
prohibited by federal criminal statutes.99 The government has a legitimate purpose in seeking to protect the interest of its young citizens but not at the expense of the fundamental freedoms of
adults.100 The conduct they sought to prohibit in the Communications Decency Act, to ban the use of interactive computers for any
request, proposal, or other communications to minors that describes sexual or excretory functions or organs,101 is already punishable under the Child Sexual Exploitation Protection Act.102 In
fact, the criminal sanctions under that statute go further in assuring
society protection from offenders, by providing for longer jail
terms than those allowed by the Communications Decency Act.
The legislative purpose of censorship in the Communications Decency Act already can be achieved more effectively absent censorship and by means substantially narrower to achieving the legitimate governmental interest of protecting minors from sexual
exploitation.103 It thereby failed the requirement of narrow tailoring for any content-based regulations.104
Restrictions on obscenity, however, have been upheld by the
Supreme Court when an offending expression, which taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex in a patently offensive
way and lacks any literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.105
Yet the Supreme Court, in Miller v. California,106 had a difficult
time setting forth any national standards for obscenity. Instead, the
99. See Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251,
2252 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
100. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
101. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230.
102. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-225, 92 Stat 7 (Feb. 6, 1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (West,
WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 105-165, Mar. 20, 1998)).
103. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346-48.
104. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1988); see also Shea v.
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 940-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declaring the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to be an overly broad restraint on protected communication between
adults).
105. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
106. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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Court left it to jurors in the forum community to apply a contemporary local standard of morality and for state legislators to set forth
specific sexual conduct they deemed to be pornographic within
their jurisdiction.107
Although we are one nation, we are too culturally diverse to
expect a national standard to apply to all communities. In Miller,
the Court admitted that to do so would be an exercise in futility.108
Imagine then, what it would be like to apply a global standard of
morality where some nations permit and encourage bigamy, nudity, and the like. What may be accepted behavior on the streets of
Times Square will not necessarily sit well in the Mormon communities of Utah. It would be an insurmountable task to monitor the
Internet with cyber cops. The Communications Decency Act’s attempt to sanitize the Internet of indecency would homogenize the
unprecedented information exchange taking place in cyberspace.
The right to voice opinions, expressions, and the like is not
confined to the isolation of a person in solitary confinement where
the only voice heard is his own. The activity of interpersonal
communication is so fundamental to the educational and developmental process of human interaction that society’s future depends
on a robust exchange in the marketplace of ideas. The way to
promote the growth of the evils that live among us is to send them
underground where they can fester unobserved. Is it not better for
parents to monitor the activities of their children and foster in them
some responsibility, rather than forcing them to seek knowledge in
the lure of the forbidden? Today’s parents tend to expect legislation to pick up the slack for the lack of the so-called quality time
they spend being involved in the development of their children.
Limiting the dissemination of allegedly indecent material on
the Internet restricts the adult population to exchanging material
only suitable for children, thereby stunting the development of society. Even such restrictions, when applied to obscene material
with which minors may have contact, have been staunchly overturned by the Supreme Court as manifestly against conditions nec-

107. Id. at 30.
108. Id. at 30-31.
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essary for the maintenance and progress of a free society.109 Although it has been noted that First Amendment protections do not
apply to obscene materials, adults within the confines of their own
homes have been shielded from the invasion of governmental control over their private reading materials.110
Little is more secluded than sitting in the privacy of your own
home and turning on your computer to read, to write, or to browse
the Internet. In Stanley v. Georgia,111 the Supreme Court held that
while states have a right to regulate obscenity, they do not have the
power to infringe on an individual’s primary liberty of freedom of
expression behind closed doors.112 Legislatures, therefore, have
the difficult task of protecting the interests of children while simultaneously preserving the individual rights at the core of the Constitution.
The Internet is not an intruder. We invite it into our home.
Just like the cable user described in Cruz v. Ferre113 or the dial-aporn user outlined in Sable Communications v. FCC,114 the Internet explorer must make a monthly decision whether to continue his
subscription to the Internet and, if dissatisfied, he may cancel his
subscription at any time.115 The Internet explorer is a pilot charting his own course. By virtue of the subscription-only access, innocent bystanders cannot be offended by the chance confrontation
of indecent material, nor can children too young to read or write be
able to access World Wide Web sites without the knowledge to
type commands that will get them there.
Parents must take deliberate steps to bring the Internet and all it
contains into their homes, thereby purposefully exposing their
children to its contents with full knowledge of its global reach.
The parents are the gatekeepers of the message and can easily
109. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989); see also Butler
v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (finding that a law banning dissemination of books to
general public, based upon protection of minors, was an unreasonable restriction on the
fundamental liberties of a free society).
110. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
111. 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
112. Id.
113. 755 F.2d 1415, 1419 (11th Cir. 1985).
114. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
115. See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420.
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close the door to the world if they so choose.
Because content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny,
the Sable Court looked at other ways to protect minors from exposure to indecent material. The Sable Court found that alternatives
existed which were less restrictive than an outright ban, and held
that cutting adult access to indecency is not narrowly tailored to
meet the government’s goal.116 As the judicial view shifts the onus
from the industry to parents to the industry again, in keeping a safe
harbor for children to mature, perhaps the best solution would be to
split the responsibility between the rapidly developing industry and
the guardians of our young citizens.
Several alternatives have been explored, some with high success rates and others which are not as feasible in the current market. Time channeling for sensitive material, which has been upheld by the courts in narrow applications,117 is not workable in a
medium like the Internet, where both senders and receivers are located in different time zones and can simultaneously transmit or
access information. Restricted use, on the other hand, is much
more practicable as a shared responsibility between the industry
and parents without placing a tremendous economic burden on either. Selective screening and blocking programs are currently
available and do not require any extensive modifications to existing industry or home equipment.
The industry voluntarily developed screening computer programs to assist parents in limiting access by minors to questionable
sites on the Internet. Programs, such as CyberPatrol from Microsystems Software, work by screening out access to questionable
Web sites as rated by PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection: a ratings systems developed by major commercial content
providers.118 Other screening programs, such as SafeSurf, focus on
child-friendly sites, again as rated by the software program developer.119

116. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129.
117. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
118. See Farhan Memon, How to Keep Your Children Away from this Stuff?, N.Y.
POST, Feb. 8, 1996, at 28.
119. See id.
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The screening programs place more control in the hands of
parents and allow them to supervise, directly or indirectly, their
children’s use of the Internet. Only the most ingenious minors
with computer expertise far beyond the knowledge of the ordinary
parent or adult will be able to hack their way through the blocking
software. Screening software allows parents, who so desire, to
shield their children from questionable material while simultaneously providing adults access to the unrestricted, constitutionally
protected so-called indecent sites. It is the least restrictive method
available to meet the government’s dual purpose of preserving our
nation’s fundamental liberty of protected speech and shielding the
nation’s youth from indecency.120
If it is United States policy to preserve the vibrant market of
the Internet, to maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, and to encourage industry development of
filtering technologies to empower parents, then a censorship provision seems to defeat the goal. Placing shutters on the marketplace
of ideas is not the way to keep material from seeping through the
floorboards. Perhaps today’s parents are looking to Congress to
legislate away responsibility that is part and parcel of rearing children.
It is doubtful our founding fathers had planned on usurping parental authority in child rearing when setting forth the foundation
of protected speech. Rather, it can be argued that the framers
sought to firmly establish paternal protectionism by encouraging
the marketplace of ideas and leaving it to parents to present it to
their children in terms they see fit and at the appropriate time in
their development. What better way to ensure the continuation of a
freethinking society than by allowing an uncensored exchange of
ideas between generations to come on a global basis.
PROF. SIMS: Thank you. Now, Mr. Steinhardt.
MR. STEINHARDT: In Reno v. ACLU,121 the Supreme Court
essentially said that the Communications Decency Act was overbroad, that it attempted to regulate speech or the access of adults to
speech in the name of protecting children, and that it inevitably
120. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
121. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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would have that result.122 The Court did not say that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague, but it came very, very close. Justice
Stevens, in his majority opinion, said that “the vagueness of the
language of indecency and patent offensiveness” contributed to the
overbreadth of the statute.123
The most interesting thing in light of recent developments was
that the Court did not decide this case on the grounds that there
were less-restrictive alternatives.124 There had been much testimony at the trial before the special three-court panel in Philadelphia about less-restrictive alternatives, about various kinds of
software filtering content locking-and-rating tools, but neither the
lower court nor the Supreme Court saw the case as turning on that
point. That is an especially important factor as we look at what has
occurred within three weeks of this landmark decision, a sweeping
decision.
We had the first White House summit on what some have
come to call censorware. That summit involved discussion of an
undifferentiated, non-critically examined set of tools for rating,
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2344 (“The vagueness of the [Communications Decency Act] is a matter
of special concern . . . .”).
124. In striking down the indecency provisions of the Communications Decency
Act, the Supreme Court reapplied the categorical First Amendment analysis that appeared
to have been abandoned in Denver Area Educational TV Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727 (1996), a fractured opinion that undermined the applicability of settled First
Amendment tests. See ACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). In Reno, the Court found
that the Internet bears none of the characteristics that subject other media, such as broadcasting, to lesser First Amendment protection. Id. at 2343-44 (“[O]ur cases provide no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet].”). The Court found that the Internet does not suffer from the same spectrum
scarcity as broadcasting. Id. (noting that the Internet has virtually unlimited potential for
growth) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (setting forth the spectrum scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation)). The Reno Court found that Internet is
“not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television” or as accessible to children. Id. at 2343 (citing
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (setting forth the invasiveness rationale for
broadcast regulation)). Moreover, the Court found that Internet communications do not
invade the home or appear on the computer screen “unbidden,” as do television images,
and Internet users, unlike radio listeners and television viewers, are unlikely to encounter
indecent content by accident because “almost all sexually explicit images [on the Internet] are preceded by warnings as to the content.” Id. at 2343. Accordingly, the Court
subjected the Communications Decency Act to strict scrutiny, rather than the lower levels
of scrutiny reserved for regulation of other media.
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blocking, and filtering the Internet. A second summit occurred a
few weeks ago and the White House participated again, although
the summit was held in a hotel rather than facing the Rose Garden.
There has been a very shocking development. Although the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the analogy to broadcast, we
have had a series of proposals that treat the Internet as if it were
television or radio. Those proposals suggest regulations on content
on the Internet that, under American theories of free speech, most
people would never conceive of making in regard to the print. For
example, some proposals advocate a labeling system or a series of
self and third party rating systems.
The quizzical thing, from my perspective, is that no one would
ever suggest that all of the publishers in the print world, namely,
newspaper publishers, magazine publishers, book publishers, writers, and editors, get together and come up with a system for rating
content. Here, you have the Supreme Court saying, on the one
hand, that this medium is entitled to at least as much protection as
the print world and is not analogous to broadcast. Nonetheless,
three weeks later, we begin to discuss rating systems. In fact, the
President has referred to the possibility of a V-chip for the Internet.125
Similarly, there have been proposals that search engines—
which serve a function similar to the Index to Periodicals for the
print world—adopt those rating systems and block out, that is, refuse to report on, the existence of either unrated or badly rated
cites.126 No one would ever suggest that for the Index of Periodicals.
Nor would anyone ever suggest for print, as has been suggested
for the Internet, that everyone agree to rate their own content, that
the government require the content to be rated, and that the government provide for punishment for punish those who mis-rate.
No one would ever suggest that for the print world. Certainly no
one would ever be able to successfully establish that for the print
world.
125. See Laurie J. Flynn, Child’s Play on Web Includes Safety Net, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 1, 1997, at 18.
126. See id.
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The first judicial challenge to the application of some of these
new filtering and blocking technologies is taking place in Virginia,
where the Loudoun County library system has adopted for all patrons, both adults and children, use of the X-Stop blocking software.127 Although X-Stop has been marketed as a product which
will block out pornography, bestiality, child pornography, and explicitly sexual materials, like many of the stand-alone blocking
products that have been introduced in homes, libraries, and other
public institutions, it in fact is a broad tool that blocks out, among
other things, the Quaker web site, the American Association of
University Women, and—my personal favorite—even a Mormon
web site that cautions against masturbation.128
Nonetheless, my biggest fear is that these matters will not simply come up in the context of libraries or other public institutions,
but that we are moving toward a view of regulating the Internet as
if it were a broadcast medium. Such a view endangers free speech
on the Internet. This is very dangerous, especially in light of the
Supreme Court’s characterization of the Internet as “the most participatory medium . . . the ultimate marketplace of ideas.”129
We see the move by private industry toward the adoption of
rating/filtering systems that could well result in a more commercialized, bland, and homogenized Internet. Such action by private
industry may lead to an Internet in which quirky speech and individual home pages are either blocked from view or are rendered
invisible by search engines, which refuse to report on their existence.
There is a real danger that restricting the potential of the Internet will rob individuals who, as was suggested earlier, do not own
the print presses of the New York Times or the broadcast license of
WCBS Radio in New York City, of the opportunity to use this medium to reach audiences great and small. We have to be very careful about that. My fellow panelist Parry Aftab, I am sure, will talk
about this issue some more.

127. See Amy Harmon, Library Suit Becomes Key Test of Freedom to Use the
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at D1 (discussing background of case).
128. See id.
129. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
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It is an extremely complex issue: the issue of Internet filtering/blocking. It is more complex than the Communications Decency Act, which the Supreme Court obviously found to be a fairly
simple issue in legal terms. But it is something that we are going
to worry about, not only because it raises constitutional law questions when those technologies are employed by the government,
but because it will shape the nature of the Internet itself.
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Steinhardt. Mr. Peters is next.
MR. PETERS: Because the title of this section is Restricting
Speech on the Internet: Finding an Appropriate Regulatory
Framework, it seems to me that there are two questions: first,
whether there is a need for regulation, and second, whether a particular regulation is constitutional.
In brief, there is a need for regulation on the Internet, particularly in regard to obscenity and indecency. I should add that at
Morality in Media, our primary focus is pornography. It is my
opinion that regulation is needed because the home use of screening technology will not alone solve this problem.
The home use of screening technology will not work because
first, no screening technology blocks all offending sites,130 second,
no screening technology is foolproof—kids can get around it,131
third, not all parents will use it,132 fourth, not all of the parents who
do use it will use it wisely and carefully,133 and finally, children
can and will be able to access computers outside of the home.134
In New York City, children can access the Internet through
school,135 the library,136 places of employment,137 retail businesses,
130. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Parents Can Take Steps To Monitor Kids Online,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1997, at 4.
131. See Lance Gay, Firms Found Ways to Keep Workers from Smut Sites, STARTRIB., July 6, 1997, at D4 (stating that “computer-educated children can find backdoor
ways of getting information they want.”)
132. See Gil Klein, Summit Debates Interact Risk to Youths, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1997, at A2.
133. See id.
134. See David S. Broder, Gore in His High Tech Element in California, Promotes
Science and Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at A11.
135. See Abby Goodnough, Internet Access Puts Burden of Control on Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1997, § 1, at 1.
136. See Amy Harmon, On Office PC, Bosses Opt for All Work, No Play, N.Y.
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a friend’s home, and, in the future, pocket computers. Although I
agree that pocket computers are not going to be great for viewing
visual sex, they certainly would be excellent for chat rooms. Now,
I do not know how anyone can say, with a straight face, that home
use of screening technology is the answer to protecting kids from
pornography on the Internet.
The second point in terms of the need for Internet regulation of
indecency is that voluntary steps by the on-line services and Internet service providers (“ISP”) will also not be sufficient. The reason for that, in my opinion, is that for the most part, the Internet
industry has been unwilling to do everything it can do to curb pornography, and I do not see any reason to expect that to change.
Interestingly, when the computer on-line services world consisted of America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe, only Prodigy
made an honest effort to protect kids against the junk.138 Prodigy
really took strong action against all forms of pornography.139
America Online and CompuServe did not. I’ve got a file filled
with articles describing instances of sexual exploitation of children
that involved America Online. I think I’ve got one article on Prodigy.
The point being that the Internet industry has not shown a willingness, to this point, to do what is needed to solve this problem
voluntarily. My fellow panelist Barry Steinhardt raised points that
indicate that solving this problem voluntarily would not be easy,
even if the Internet industry were willing to do everything possible.
Related to this, there are thousands of ISPs already. Even if the
major ones were willing to come up with some kind of voluntary,
genuine solution to this, this would not protect the thousands of
people using the other ISPs. It is safe to say that, given the nature

TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A1.
137. See id.
138. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
139. See Marc Jacobson, Prodigy: It May Be Many Things to Many People, But it is
Not a Publisher For Purposes of Libel and Other Opinions, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 673 (1996); R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Defamation in Cyberspace: A Court Takes
a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services
Co., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589, 593-94 (1996).
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of the Internet community, many ISPs will not go along with any
voluntary plan.
So, Congress should try to draft intelligent legislation which,
while it will not solve the whole problem by any means, will provide some protection in conjunction with the use of home screening technology and whatever else is available. That is the position
that I have taken from day one. I have never felt that the law was
the whole answer to this problem. I also concluded long ago that
without the law, there will be no answer to protecting children on
the Internet.
Now, I have some points on the impact of Reno v. ACLU.140 I
think that it depends in part on how you read the case. It can be
read as validating the view that there shall be no regulation of indecency on the Internet; there are statements in Justice Stevens’s
opinion that would support that view.141 Another way to look at
the case is as striking down a particular law because of glaring defects in that law.142
Now, assuming that the second view is the correct interpretation of Reno v. ACLU,143 I will just mention briefly three problems
with the Communications Decency Act that we recognized at Morality in Media. I should add that although we did have some input
in shaping the Communications Decency Act, we did not shape the
entire piece of legislation. For the most part, it was out of our
hands. But in terms of problems that we recognized, both early on
and as time went along:
First, it is arguable that it was Congress’s job, not the courts, to
sort through the many technological complexities of the Internet
and craft a piece of legislation that recognized that there are different forms of communication on the Internet. Some parts of the
Internet function like broadcasting. Other parts of the Internet are
similar to accessing a library.144 There are all kinds of chat

140. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
141. See id. at 2332-33.
142. See id.
143. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
144. See Glenn Kubota, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering Software: Book
Banning Reincarnated?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 687, 692 (1997).
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rooms,145 which are kind of like party lines found on the telephone.
The Internet also has news groups,146 which might count as a totally different means of communication.
I hasten to add there was an article recently in the Wall Street
Journal, describing how news groups were regulating themselves,147 and another article in the New York Times about how
chat lines were regulating themselves.148 If self-regulation is possible, so is legal regulation.
But the point is that the Internet is a complex media, which
presents the interesting legal question of who must sort out he
complexities, and decide how to regulate the Internet. Is it Congress’s job or the FCC’s or the courts’?
I think a good case could be made, given the state of technology for the Internet, that it really was Congress’s job, not the
courts’. I do not think anybody would argue with the following
statement: Congress did not do that job. Basically, Congress provided us with a blunderbuss statute with some specific defenses
that admittedly would not always apply,149 and presumably thought
that the courts were going to work out this complex thing on a
case-by-case basis.150
But given the fact that we were dealing with a criminal law,151
that approach presented difficulties. In any case, it would have
been better had Congress worked through most of the problems instead of throwing the thing in the lap of the courts.

145. See Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment
Protection For Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (1997).
146. See Jeffery M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators For Defamation Published By Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation Into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247,
253 (1995).
147. See Timothy Hanrahan, The Internet: The Moderator, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1997, at R26.
148. See Laurie J. Flynn, Taking In the Sites; Web Discussion Forums Both Public
and Private, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1997, at D6; see also Lisa Bransten, Companies Are
Talking Up Chat Rooms. More Firms See Them As Way To Improve Service, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 15, 1997, at B10.
149. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e) (West 1998
& Supp. 1998).
150. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2339, 2345 (1997).
151. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 223(a), 223(d).
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Part of my explanation for why Congress enacted such legislation is that there are some members of Congress who do not like
the FCC. Congress should have handed the job of devising medium-specific regulations to the FCC. My suspicion, however, is
that even that would not have worked. But a lot more progress
would have been made in terms of coming up with an intelligent
law.
A second problem with the Communications Decency Act was
that neither the FCC nor the lower courts had adequately clarified
the indecency definition.152 Certainly, wealthy radio stations have
been fined by the FCC for indecency violations, but because the
fines were relatively small, the stations paid them and did not raise
any legal challenges.153
And so, basically speaking, while we do have FCC rulings that
address indecency, there is not much real law. In particular, the
courts have seldom examined the application of the indecency
standard and tried to set some limits or clarify some things. That
was never done.
The Supreme Court was justified in recognizing that it is not
wise to expect little Joe Citizen to have the same knowledge of the
law as the FCC.154 I guess, in hoping that the Court would uphold
this law, Congress hoped the Court would do a better job clarifying
the indecency standard than the FCC. But the Court declined to do
so. I found it very interesting, however, that while the Supreme
Court was unwilling to flesh out the indecency standard, the Court
was willing to clarify the concept of sexual harassment by providing guidelines,155 which were both criticized156 and recognized as a
step in the right direction.157
152. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
153. See Chris McConnell, FCC Indecency Review Yields Few Fines,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 27, 1997, at 26.
154. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329 (discussing reasons for invalidating portions of
the Communications Decency Act on vagueness grounds).
155. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
156. See Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court’s Standard Response: Creating an
Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment Harassment Under Title VII,
24 STETSON L. REV. 719 (1995).
157. See Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems: A Modest Clarification of
the Inquiry in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1515
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Now, whether or not they were justified at this point in time in
refusing that invitation is a question that I can not answer. At any
rate, in a court case arising in the television medium a couple of
years ago, the FCC was supposed to clarify the indecency standard
and they did not.158
I just happened to read in Broadcasting & Cable magazine that
the new FCC Commissioner considers that task a priority.159 I
hope that the FCC does a wise job in clarifying the indecency standard.
My point is that we recognized problems in the current indecency standard. Arguably, the Supreme Court could have provided
the clarity that was lacking. But in its defense, the Court did not
have much to work with. There was not a good, sound body of law
available to consult. In large part, they would have had to craft the
standard on their own. So, perhaps wisely, they chose not to do it.
The third problem with the Communications Decency Act concerns the choice between two standards: harmful-to-minors160 versus indecency.161 We fought for the indecency standard, but only
because we felt there were also problems with non-consenting
adults being exposed to indecency on the Internet. It has always
been our position that the indecency standard is an indecent-for-all
standard that is intended for what, in effect, is a mixed audience of
adults and children.
If you look at the origins of the indecency concept, I think it is
an honest statement to say that the main purpose of it was not to
protect children.162 It was a public morality and public sensibilities
concern. Thus, in proceedings involving broadcast indecency, the
FCC unilaterally decided that non-consenting adults, in the privacy
(1994).
158. See Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75 (1996).
159. See Chris McConnell, Channel Surfing with New FCC: Democratic Majority
May Be More Willing To Regulate Content, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 24, 1997, at
26.
160. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1968).
161. See The Communications Decency Act: A Cyber-Gag to First Amendment
Rights on the Internet, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 187, 205-09 (1997).
162. See Alec Harrell, Note, Who Cares About Prior Restraint? An Analysis of the
FCC’s Enforcement of Indecency Forfeiture Orders, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 239, 240-41
(1996).
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of their home, should not be protected against indecency. The only
valid government concern that the FCC was willing to recognize
was the concern for children.
That was the decision the FCC made, despite the fact that, in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,163 the Supreme Court had specifically, both in the plurality opinion and concurring opinion, recognized the valid interest of protecting adults in the privacy of the
home from indecency.164 But in our opinion, if the only concern
was protecting children, particularly where pornography is concerned, clearly the obscene for minors standard was the one most
appropriate.
In terms of what is next, clearly the answer depends on what is
the correct interpretation of the Court’s decision. Part of it also
depends on what action, if any, is taken by Congress.
Many accused Congress of using the Communications Decency Act for political purposes.165 I think there is some truth to
that. Congress wanted to be on record in an election year as doing
something about pornography on the Internet. It will now be interesting to see how committed Congress really is in protecting children.
A related issue is whether Congress will be able to swallow its
pride and authorize the FCC to address the specifics of the Internet
with specific regulations tailored to the specific problems, in contrast to Congress throwing out another general piece of legislation.
If Congress does decide to try again, I suggest that it gets the FCC
involved because the FCC is suited to address this problem. I
would also say that it is pretty clear from Reno v. ACLU that
someone must examine each form of Internet communication, the
problems that may arise in particular forms of communication, and
draft a proposed law or regulations aimed at particular problems.166
Obviously, there will be some questions that have to be answered
in specific cases. That is the job of the Supreme Court and the

163. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
164. Id. at 731 n.2; see also id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. See Patrick A. Trueman, Porn on the Internet, Here and Abroad, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at A19.
166. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2331-33 (1997).

PANEL3.TYP

426

9/29/2006 4:44 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:395

lower courts.
My last recommendation is that Congress avoid repeating the
mistake of letting the on-line services and ISPs off the hook. In
my opinion, the Internet content providers can do a lot more than
the lower courts167 and the Supreme Court168 found that they can
do. I previously mentioned articles in the Wall Street Journal and
the New York Times about how different news groups and chat
rooms are self-regulating.169 Industry monitoring is possible, despite the findings of the district courts.170 Even the Supreme Court
has recognized the industry’s potential role.171
But I do recognize that there will be no effective regulation if
the whole onus is put on the content providers. In some cases, the
only entity in the Internet that may be able to effectively block
children's access is the Internet access provider. In my opinion,
because those folks give Congress a lot of money, they got off the
hook.
It is safe to say that efforts toward protecting children from indecency on the Internet will not succeed unless Congress holds online services and ISPs responsible for what they can realistically
do. We were involved in the crafting of the Communications Decency Act, and I will tell you nobody was trying to put an obligation on anybody that would be, practically speaking, impossible.
But clearly the Internet access providers can do something other
than provide parents with the option of adding home screening
technology.
If Congress lets them off the hook again, only kids with responsible parents who manage to inculcate their children with the
necessary moral values will be protected on the Internet; and, just
167. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that Internet
content providers cannot prevent material from reaching users once such material is
posted on the web).
168. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
169. See Weber, supra note 147.
170. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863 (explaining that treating Internet content providers as publishers would expose them to liabilities against which they could not protect
due to the difficulty of removing posted messages or preventing obscene material from
reaching users once posted on the web).
171. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337 (recognizing that credit card verification systems
can determine the age of the user).
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plainly speaking, the rest of them be damned.
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Robert Peters. Our final speaker to set
the stage for our open discussion is Ms. Aftab.
MS. AFTAB: I am going to take a different tack. Because you
now understand everything you need to know about restricting
speech in cyberspace, let me tell you a little bit about Fordham
Law School.
Last year I sat on this panel.172 It was just before the Communications Decency Act oral argument. I was thrilled to have been
asked to speak. At that time, I ran a whole bunch of on-line legal
discussions for lawyers, I was host of the Court TV Law Center’s
legal help line and America Online’s (“AOL”) legal discussions,
and all these other things, which just means that I talked a lot online; it did not mean that I was necessarily an expert on free
speech.
So I was invited and I learned an incredible amount at this
panel because both the chief lawyer arguing the case for the
ACLU173 and the chief lawyer arguing for the government174 were
panelists. The brief of the ACLU175 was going in the next morning
and we were trying to find out what it was going to say. We were
all very excited about this. I learned about the Communications
Decency Act at that panel discussion.
A week later, I got a phone call from CNN. They asked me if I
would cover the Communications Decency Act oral argument for
them and talk about child-filtering software. I am a mother; I am
forty-six years old; my kids are in college; what do I know about
child-filtering software? I had no idea what they were talking
about.
But I consulted last year’s second issue of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, and I
went to the underlying decision. Sure enough, the opinion talked
172. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law: Indecency on the Internet: Constitutionality of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 463 (1997).
173. See id. Christopher A. Hansen was chief counsel for the ACLU.
174. See id. Theodore C. Hirt was the chief lawyer for the United States.
175. See Brief for Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511).
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about child-filtering software.
So I did the piece for CNN. We talked about free speech on
the Internet and I recited everything I had learned at the panel and
everything I had learned about children’s Internet safety and filtering software.176 I got more phone calls, e-mail, and letters from
parents after that one appearance on CNN than I had ever gotten
from any other appearances on CNN or anywhere else. They
wrote, “This is great. How safe are my kids? I understand this argument and I appreciate free speech, but I’ve got kids and I don’t
know what to do with them, and I don’t even know how to turn on
a computer much less protect them in cyberspace.”
So I called my sister, who is a pediatrician for AOL on Prime
and for Parent Time, and I said, “Find a book that somebody has
written and give me the title so that every time somebody sends me
one of these e-mails, I’ll tell them to go buy the book.” She could
not find one, but she is a doctor, and doctors do not read, so I
called up my friends trying to find one. No one could find one.
Then we figured out that there really was not a book out there to
teach parents the basics in an efficient way.
So I decided to start an outline for such a book. In fact, we
wrote the first definitive book that really covers all the topics.177
Now I understand a lot more about filtering software. Let me tell
you what I have learned over the last year.
I have learned that the statements I made on CNN and the
statements that Robert Peters just made here, about how children
can get around this stuff, is not as true as I thought it was when I
first spoke on television. I located young hackers and promised
them $100 for every one of the four software programs that we
tested: CyberPatrol, Net Nanny, CyberSitter, and Surf Watch. I
said, “This is the software. Get around it. I’ll pay you $100, and
you’ll tell me how you did it.”
In typical big mouth manner, I contacted the software companies and told them that child hackers could easily hack their filtering programs. They all panicked and wanted to know how the
176. See CNN TODAY: Products Offered to Parents to Screen Internet (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 19, 1997).
177. See AFTAB, supra note 3.
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child hackers had done it. So I sent an e-mail to Chris, who was
my child hacker, asking, “Hey, Chris, how did you break it?” He
said, “Oh, I couldn’t break it.” So we had to change the text of the
book. But I learned that it is not so easy to get around those programs.
I also learned that parents are not sure that they want to use
those programs. Parents want to keep their children safe, but a lot
of them want to know how to keep their children safe on their own.
I have spoken with various members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives about Internet legislation and
children Internet safety and filtering on-line. Every single one of
them who has asked me to talk with them has asked me questions
about filtering software and I have answered them. At the end,
they typically remark how terrible the problem is and that the solution is to get children off the Internet. But I think that view is part
of the problem, not the solution.
I started out as a free-speech advocate. Although I started writing the book very free-speech oriented, I recognized that parents
have a legitimate concern. There has to be a way to give parents a
handle on keeping their children safe without encroaching on the
constitutional rights of other people. Indecency is constitutionally
permitted for adults.178 I did not want to rewrite the indecency
standard, but I did want to rewrite the obscenity standard in this
country.
I also have a lot of problems with the fact that obscenity standards were being based on where the material was read. For example, because material that was put on the Internet in California
was read in Tennessee, it was judged under Tennessee standards.179
So I see a lot of those problems and as I got more involved and
became one of the experts, reluctantly, of filtering software, I have
learned that we really need structure.
Although I used to think that the filtering software was going
to be the answer, I no longer think so. I really think that educating
178. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
179. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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parents is the answer. I do not think it is regulation.
I have seen the new “Son of CDA”180 that Senator Coats has
put out and, after discussing it with other cyberspace lawyers who
think that it actually may pass constitutional challenge, a lot of us
are uncomfortable with it. I do not like any regulations on the
Internet because I see the beauty of the evolution of the Internet on
an international basis.
There has been an evolution from last year, when I sat here in
this room, to my involvement at the summit. I was brought in to
help prepare most of the White Paper for the Child Advocacy Task
Force because I was seen as a moderate. The religious right
groups and some of the more protective groups recognized that
they needed a broader base of people to support what they were
doing, and I was brought in for that reason.
It was the first time I really had an open dialogue with a lot of
groups. I have met a lot of groups who are actually doing things to
try to clean up the parts of cyberspace that most of us agree should
be cleaned up.
I met a group called Cyber Angels,181 which until then I was
not particularly thrilled about. I had read about them. They are affiliated with the Guardian Angels. But they actually find sites of
child pornography and child abuse on-line and they try to shut
them down. They will patrol chat rooms. They have 60,000
members worldwide patrolling chat rooms and trying to keep people from preying on others.
Regardless of your opinion, that kind of thing can be done. I
think that there is a strong base of people trying to do something,
which is fine because something must be done.
I think the answer might be a combination. When my children
were growing up, I let them eat peanut butter and jelly, pizza, and
Spaghetti-O’s, and the only rule I had—against Welch’s grape
180. Internet Material Harmful to Minors Amendment, S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997)
(amending Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit distribution on the web of material
harmful to minors).
181. See generally Rachel Sylvester, Vigilantes Keep Cyberspace Safe from Criminals, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 5, 1995, at 21 (discussing vigilante groups in
cyberspace).
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juice—was to protect my carpet from stains I couldn’t get out. But
my younger sister has her children eating bananas and peanut butter, not on Wonder Bread but on celery, makes all of their bread
and cookies homemade, and does not allow them to eat at McDonald’s at all. It is not up to me to tell her how to parent her children
and it is not up to her to tell me how to parent mine. I wrote the
book Parent’s Guide to the Internet: How to Protect Your Kids in
Cyberspace182 to teach parents what they need to know to make
their own choices and then to implement and enforce those
choices.
So I think that while we may be talking about laws that should
be enacted or laws that should not be enacted, or whether PICS183
is appropriate, or whether filtering software over-filters, I think we
also need to keep in mind that we need practical solutions for people who want to know now what they can do to protect their children when they go on-line. For instance, some parents might think
that they know how to be perfectly safe with their children, then
they sit down next to a computer and the child asks to see the
NASA site. The mother or father says, “Sure,” and types in
“nasa.com.” Because that parent skipped over that part of the book
where I explain that the “.com” means that it is a commercial site
and not a government site, the parent types in “nasa.com” and
finds a billboard site for six pornographic sites. It takes them right
to it.
I found that site, which came out in CNN and in a couple of
other places,184 before they started covering up the pictures. A lot
of unwilling viewers saw that site’s graphic images. And a lot of
young children who were looking for Pathfinder found themselves
learning more about biology than space.
We need to put a lot more time and attention into educating
people and giving them choices. The choices may include using
182. See AFTAB, supra note 3.
183. See generally Bruce Handy, Why Johnny Can’t Surf: How to Protect Kids from
Online Smut?, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 75 (describing the controversy surrounding the
Platform for Internet Content Selection, a world wide web consortium specification for
labeling Internet content).
184. See Lawrence Magid, Cyberculture Sex Cites Capitalizing on Misleading
URLs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at D3.
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software at your desktop to keep your children out of trouble; it
may include finding an on-line service provider or an ISP that has
server-level blocking; it may include educating your children to be
able to determine and value whatever they see, no matter what it is,
so if it is the kind of thing you do not want them to see, they will
click off of it; and it may be something in between.
But I think, as aspiring and practicing lawyers, we need to recognize that there is no one answer to this. The longer I am involved with it, the more I recognize that I do not have the answers.
So I want you to keep your eyes, your ears, and your opinions open
on this one, because my opinion has changed and I find myself in
the middle of the road.
You need to recognize that we have to address people’s concerns, and those concerns may be the same or different in other
countries. You have got to keep your eyes open and your earns
open and your brain functioning, so that the remedy fashioned will
work for everybody who wants that selection choice.
Good luck, it is going to be your job.
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Ms. Aftab. I would like to thank all of
our fine panelists for their excellent presentations.
Our format from here will be a roundtable discussion followed
by questions from the audience. I had some questions, but,
frankly, like the fisherman in the movie Jaws, I have a sense there
is already a lot of chum in the water here. So, first, would any of
you like to respond to anything that anyone else has said?
MR. PETERS: If Parry Aftab is correct, you will not have any
worry because there will not be any law to uphold or defend.
MS. AFTAB: That’s interesting.
MR. PETERS: She cannot talk to you like a young lawyer.
MS. AFTAB: I think that there will be law, I think there are
laws, and I think the laws that we have now will be applied in cyberspace in the way the Supreme Court has told us:185 that cyberspace is a library and it will be treated like print media.186 Print

185. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
186. See id. at 2347-2348.
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media has laws that govern what you can do. I think that the laws
that exist now, if we are smart about how we apply them and openminded about the technology, with a little bit of twisting and turning, work well. I do not know that I want Congress fiddling
around with something they do not yet understand.
MR. KURNIT: I would like to add to that. I am not sure that
the laws work as well as they should. People say things are imperfect. Well, when it comes to the First Amendment, it means we err
on the side of keeping the government out. We have laws dealing
with child pornography187 and pandering,188 and there is the obscenity standard.189 Before we think about making more laws,
there is a police department in Oklahoma that went out and seized
copies of The Tin Drum from people’s homes.190 Fortunately for
all of us, one of the people who had rented The Tin Drum from the

187. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.125 (Michie
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (Deering
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3a-196 (1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-100 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A
(1997); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A-C (Law. Co-op. 1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.710 (Law. Co-op. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (1997); MO. REV. STAT. §
573.025 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463
(Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-30-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-1 (Michie
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (Consol. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323
(Anderson 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1 (1997);
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-23.1
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43-26
(West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-374.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.68A.40 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-302 (Michie 1997).
188. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3209 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie
1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266 (Deering 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-203 (1997);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2705 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-12 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.84 (Michie
§ 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 426 (1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.710 (Law. Co-op.
1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-802 (Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.300
(Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Anderson 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1134-1-3 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 1625-26 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 944.33 (1996).
189. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (delineating test to determine
whether material is obscene).
190. See Police Seizure of Film ‘Tin Drum’ Illegal, Judge Rules, COM. APPEAL,
Dec. 28, 1997, at A5.
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local video store was the head of the ACLU.191 But we have
judges who do not understand that Garrison v. Maryland192 says
that police cannot just go and seize without some judicial determination first.193
Stratton Oakmont,194 when we got involved, had already turned
into a debacle because neither the judge nor the lawyers in the case
were aware that you can not generally enjoin a libel. Thus the
whole decision—which went awry until the Communications Decency Act—was based on trying to enforce an injunction against
future libel, which should never have come down at all.
So I think as lawyers, we should think about whether or not we
support a new Communications Decency Act or additional regulation when we hear that such legislation can not be perfect. It is going to be problematic. We come back to the question of whether or
not our Congress is competent to regulate a technology that it does
not understand when that technology will change before Congress
can get a bill through the process.
I do not think that there is a hole that needs to be filled. I think
that there is enough law. But, to the extent that there is a hole, if
we tried to fill it, most likely the technology would get around it
before the law could take effect or the law would be ineffective on
its face. In this realm, any effort at imposing some new regulation
will only lead to bigger problems.
MS. AFTAB: So we agree that there is a problem there now?
MR. KURNIT: Yes.
MS. AFTAB: Okay.
MR. SIMS: Ms. Fantino?
MS. FANTINO: I agree with Rick Kurnit. I think that there are
already enough statutes on the books, including the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act,195 which allows criminal penalties against
191. See id. Michael Cornfield, the development director for the Oklahoma ACLU,
brought the action. See id.
192. Garrison v. State of Maryland, 303 Md. 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
193. See id. at 391-392.
194. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
195. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
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those purveyors of child pornography.196 As for Morality in Media
worrying about adults, well, if you come upon a page you do not
like, you turn the page.
I just want to point out what a hot issue this is as the lawmakers
were very uncomfortable legislating in this area. I do not know if
you are aware of the real power of the media, but as a reporter for
CBS, it is easy for me to contact whomever I want. Every member
of the Senate Judiciary Committee whom I called returned my call.
Once they realized the subject on which I wanted a quote, they
clammed up. They would not comment on cyber-legislation, period. They are ready to talk about everything else, but when it
comes to articulating their opinion on this, they clam up.
MR. PETERS: One gap that I think Justice Stevens seemed to
have recognized was the difference between obscene for adults and
obscene for minors.197 In the real world, which we can touch at
least with our hands, there are laws that prohibit hard-core adult
obscenity for everybody.198 Courts and legislative bodies recognized decades ago that while we might want to protect certain
types of sex material for adults, they are not good for kids. So
there are two types of laws: one type prohibiting the sale of adult
obscenity to you and me,199 and another type prohibiting the sale to
196. Id. § 2251(d).
197. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997).
198. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.125 (Michie
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (Deering
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3a-196 (1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-100 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A
(1997); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A-C (Law. Co-op. 1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.710 (Law. Co-op. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (1997); MO. REV. STAT. §
573.025 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463
(Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-30-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-1 (Michie
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (Consol. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323
(Anderson 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1 (1997);
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-23.1
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43-26
(West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-374.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.68A.40 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-302 (Michie 1997).
199. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-191 91997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-20-80 (1997);
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minors of material obscene for minors,200 which is a broader standard intended to protect children.
No such law exists on the Internet at this point, certainly at the
federal level. So basically what we say on the Internet is that
whatever is protected speech for adults, in terms of pornographic
materials on the Internet, at this moment in time is also legal for
children. Now, perhaps none of you believe that is a gap. I think it
is a gap.
If you read the Reno decision, the Court referred to the “harmful to minors” law as perhaps being the answer201—at least part of
the answer.
MR. SIMS: Thank you. Any other comments?
MR. STEINHARDT: First, I am not so sure that Bob Peters
and I read the same decision, we will have to spend some time
later-on comparing notes.
We have had a lot of discussion today, and there is going to be
a lot of discussion in the future, about whether or not these statutes
can be effective. In the ultimate, they cannot be effective. We are
discussing a global medium, which perceives censorship as damage and routes around it.202 In the end, it is going to be very difficult to have any law, whether it is a national law in this country or
any other country, which will successfully control all the content
of the Internet.
That, however, is going to be very cold comfort to those who
become the victims of these laws in this country or any other country, as I was reminded, for example, today when panelist Lisa Fantino mentioned the Chinese government’s attitude toward the
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (1997); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (Michie 1997).
200. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.130 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1
(Deering 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-3 (Michie 1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 28 (Law. Co-op. 1998); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 45-8-2061 (Law. Co-op. 1997); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (Anderson 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-345 (Law. Co-op.
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24-28 (Michie 1997).
201. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997).
202. See S.E. Goodman & L.T. Greenberg, Is Big Brother Hanging by His Bootstraps, COMM. ASS’N COMPUTING MACH., July 1, 1996, at 11, available in WESTLAW,
1996 WL 9011859.
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Internet. The Chinese government greatly restricts access to the
Internet.203 It is in the process of building the world’s largest
Intranet, where everything will be filtered through government
proxies.204 In the end, I do not believe the Chinese government
will be successful. I think they have opened a Pandora’s box. But
that is going to be very cold comfort to a dissident sitting in a Chinese jail cell or in a labor camp who was imprisoned for accessing
Western thought over the Internet. That is happening.
So it is important to remember as we debate whether these laws
can be effective that, even if a war cannot be won, it does not mean
there will not be innocent victims. The Communications Decency
Act was an example of that. It was a war on indecency on the
Internet that Congress could not win, but the clients represented by
the ACLU, along with the First Amendment, avoided becoming
innocent victims and prevailed.
MR. SIMS: Thank you. Any other questions or comments?
Just to pick up, I have a couple of quick questions myself. Robert
Peters, as I understand your point, you were talking about Congress, perhaps via the FCC, holding the Internet access providers
liable for failing to do what they could realistically do, as a technological matter, to screen out obscenity and indecency. But as I understand Richard Kurnit’s point, by the time Congress could define
the obligations of the Internet providers, technological advances
would likely have outstripped the legislation, enabling the users to
circumvent the access provider’s screening technology, rendering
the latter obsolete and the providers legally vulnerable under antiquated legislation and regulations. How do you respond to that?
MR. PETERS: I guess one common-sense response would be
that if the Internet access providers can provide parents with the
option to add screening technology, the process could be reversed.
I recognize the problem of the screening technology blocking too
much, but let’s just assume that screening technology could successfully block the sites that virtually everyone agrees are not suit203. See Donald Conant, et al., Collection of Articles by Carl Middlehurst of Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 471 PLI/PAT. 549, 564 (1997); Amy Knoll, Any Which Way But
Lose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 275, 296 (1996).
204. See Mark LaPedus, China Intranet To Connect 50 Cities, ELECTRONIC BUYERS
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997.
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able for access by children.
I think it would be technologically possible to simply reverse
the process and instead require adults to provide identification before they can gain access to pornographic sites. Part of the Supreme Court’s concern with the Communications Decency Act was
the Internet content providers’ difficulty in verifying identification,
which is a legitimate concern.
But clearly, the Internet access providers can check identification. In some cases, they may be the only entity on the Internet
that realistically could provide some meaningful protection for
children by effectively screening for age.
Again, I do not see legislation as the whole answer to this. It
requires a combination of technological limits and First Amendment limits. But screening technology is also not the whole answer. I sat with some students at lunch today and one of them said
his mother taught pre-school and that she was teaching her students
how to use the Internet. Now, to assume that every parent of each
one of those children is going to become knowledgeable about the
Internet and the use of the screening technology is impractical. I
have read in the New York Times205 and other places206 that most
people agree that screening technology is not the whole answer.
How can we possibly assume that every child in the United
States has a parent that will provide the necessary oversight? So I
think the law must plug some of the holes; that is how I see the
law. It can plug some of the holes. If I were in Congress, I would
try to do that, win or lose.
MR. KURNIT: One comment on that. There are ISPs that do
provide that kind of service. One told me about their structure
back when it was much more proprietary and less on the Internet.
They made it clear to their subscribers that the A subscriber could
have as many as six sub-subscribers, and the A subscriber could

205. Peter H. Lewis, An On-Line Service Halts Restriction on Sex Material, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A1.
206. See John W. Kennedy, Profamily Groups Demand More Cyberporn Prosecutions; Protecting Children From Pornography on the Internet, CHRISTIANITY TODAY,
Feb. 9, 1998; Michael A. Banks, Filtering the Net in Libraries: The Case, COMPUTERS IN
LIBRARIES, Mar. 1, 1998, at 50.
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provide that some of those sub-subscribers would not have Internet
access, but only the proprietary software. This was pretty much
ineffective, however, because they found that, in most households,
the A subscriber was a twelve-year-old child who helped his or her
mother and father gain access to the Internet.
MR. PETERS: Part of my answer to that is, if you have a parent in the home that really understands the Internet, that parent is
the best protection that child has. In many homes, where children
don’t have that Internet-savvy parent, those children are going to
need some help from some other sources.
Let’s assume that the law required all ISPs to block access to
known pornographic sites unless the subscriber provided adequate
identification. To me, that would be adequate protection for a lot
of children. It would protect them in many schools. Not all the
schools use screening technology. There is a belief that they do,
but they do not. But even in New York City, I assume teachers
would not sign up to give their six-year-olds access to hard-core
porn sites. So if that block automatically existed, a lot of children
would receive a form of protection that they do not get under the
current state of affairs.
MS. AFTAB: Even in New York. I think, however, that if
there is the kind of interest that you are talking about, it would be
very easy for somebody to set up an ISP that says: “You cannot get
access. We are going to apply filtering across-the-board and you
cannot have access to any of these other things.” And then, if there
is enough of a market need for that, a lot of people will sign up for
that. But that is choice, not law.
CyberPatrol207 is a technology used by all of the on-line service
providers. AOL uses this technology, and CompuServe and Prodigy use the product.208 There are different ways of setting it. AOL
is also one that will allow you to ban access to chat rooms, and
other on-line places, for your kids.209 Most of the other on-line

207. CyberPatrol 4.0 is manufactured by Microsystems Software. Information
about this technology is available at www.cyberpatrol.com. See Richard J. Dalton Jr., A
Safer Web for Kids, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1997, at F10.
208. See id.
209. See Carol Ellison, How to Use AOL’s Parental Controls, HOME PC, Oct. 1,
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service providers do that as well.210
There are a lot of relatively simple ways to get there. I, as an
adult, as a person who lives in the United States, and as a person
who has access to anything I want to see that is legal in this country, do not want to have to sign up with my name and my identification number to see what is perfectly legal for me to see. Knowing how data is collected on the Internet and knowing the problems
we have with privacy on the Internet, I have major concerns with
that.
I have a real problem with the fact that I might get better protection renting a videotape under the current law211 than I might
have under those circumstances. As an adult, I should not have to
sign up, qualify, and prove a lot of things to people who may be
able to take information from me on-line.
It is much easier to restrict the children. As an adult, I do not
want my children pre-selected to have certain information. I want
my children to be able to measure things knowledgeably, and I
want to be able to educate my children so they know that certain
things are unacceptable. Whether it is in a movie or in a book or
on the Internet, I want to teach my children that there are certain
things that they should turn off when they see, as opposed to my
pre-screening a lot of things for them. But that is my choice as a
parent. I just do not want anyone else making those choices for
me.
MR. PETERS: If I could respond to that, to my knowledge,
Internet access is not free. If you are paying for Internet access,
the ISP already has personal information about you. So in terms of
finding out how old you are, it is a minor thing if they already have
your credit card numbers and other information.
MS. AFTAB: But not at that site.

1997, at 175.
210. For example, America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe all provide control
features that allow users to block access to chat rooms. See Nancy Tamosaitis, Parental
Discretion Advised; Steer Clear of Cyberspace’s Steamier Side, COMPUTER LIFE, Nov. 1,
1994, at 163.
211. In New York, for example, personal privacy and personal information are protected by statute. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 671 (McKinney 1997).
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MR. PETERS: No, no, no. I am talking about the age screening process taking place when you sign up for access to the Internet. It does not always have to occur at a chat room or newsgroup
or Web site. There could be privacy protections in the law to ensure that ISPs will not give out this information.
I am just saying that, relatively speaking, that intrusion for you,
the customer, is a very small one because you already signed your
life over to them when you signed up for the service.
MS. AFTAB: I think it is a big intrusion. But, then again, I
understand Internet technology.
MR. STEINHARDT: I think you really have to spend more
time on-line. You need to get a sense of the breadth of the Internet. You have this notion of the Internet as television, where
maybe there are 120 channels. There are millions of web sites,212
and that does not even begin to deal with news groups, chat rooms,
e-mail, and all the other forms of communication on the Internet.
And I can tell you from representing people who have been thrown
out of America Online that America Online is pretty aggressive in
monitoring chat rooms.213
MS. AFTAB: I was thrown off.
MR. STEINHARDT: If you could be thrown off, anybody
could be thrown off. I have never actually been thrown off. I
guess I’m embarrassed by that.
MS. AFTAB: You have to know what you need to do.
MR. STEINHARDT: That’s right. I do know.
The notion that an Internet service provider is going to be in a
position to effectively pick and choose those sites which are appropriate for children is really fanciful. When America Online, for
example, tried to filter on the basis of certain key words, one of the
words they filtered out was the word “breast.”214 What happened?
212. The number of World Wide Web sites is estimated between two and four million, with the number continuously growing. See Greg Mazurkiewicz, Nothing But Net:
Useful Internet Sites, Air Conditioning, HEATING & REFRIGERATION NEWS, Sept. 29,
1997, at 6; The Web of Information Inequality, LANCET, June 21, 1997, at 1781.
213. See Michael Beebe, AOL Draws Line on Fighting Child Pornography, BUFF.
NEWS, Oct. 1, 1997, at A15.
214. See, Ari Staiman, Note, Shielding Internet Users from Undesirable Content:
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They blocked out breast cancer awareness sites. There was a great
uproar among their subscribers and the content providers about
that.
It is very, very difficult to do this. The notion that you can
hold the Internet service provider liable for all the billions of words
and images that are on the Internet is just not realistic. It is certainly not fair or consistent with basic notions of the law, and certainly constitutional law, in this country.
MR. PETERS: From my side, I recognize that nobody can
block out all of this stuff. But if they can block out most of it, that
is better than nothing. I do not want to impose a legal burden on
America Online or anybody else that they realistically cannot
comply with. But if there are some simple things that they can do
that are within their means, then I think the law ought to require
those things. Unfortunately, I think the law must require them because many would not do so otherwise. The idea that every child
has a lovely, perfect parent is a myth. If things continue to go the
way they are now, it is not going to get better in our lifetime.
MS. AFTAB: At the Internet summit,215 the ISPs and the online service providers received some substantial criticism. There
are hotlines that have been set up with both the United States Customs Service and the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, which maintains a web site as well.216 You can report
what you think is already illegal. If you find obscenity that you
think violates the law, you can report it. The ISPs or the on-line
service providers have agreed to try to limit access to sites that are
clearly illegal, such as child pornography sites and a lot of other
sites.217 So if it is pointed out to them, they will limit access; they
The Advantages of a PICS Based Rating System, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 866, 908 (1997);
Ann Beeson, Top Ten Threats to Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 10, 12
(1996).
215. The “Internet Online Summit: Focus on Children” was held in Washington,
D.C., from December 1 to 3, 1997. See Bob Dart, Summit Takes on Net Safety; Internet
Summit Focuses on Kids, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 28, 1997, at B1.
216. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children can be accessed at
www.missingkids.org. See Carolyn Jabs, Parents’ Online Survival Guide—Our Tips Will
Show You How to Keep Kids Safe Every Time They Go Online, HOME PC, Mar. 1, 1998,
at 89.
217. In 1996, the Internet Service Providers Association (“ISPA”) and London
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have agreed to do that.
I do not know that I want AOL or Steve Case218 deciding what
I should be seeing either, or judging what is or is not obscene. I
think that is what our courts are supposed to do. In any case, once
we point out something that is legally impermissible, they will respond. They have agreed that they will.
MR. SIMS: Just picking up on a couple of themes mentioned
earlier, I think that Ms. Aftab just emphasized a rather interesting
proposition, namely, that as a parent she should have the right to
make her own decisions about how her children react to indecency
in the world and on the Internet. And, by the way, I want to point
out that her point very much picks up the theme of the liberal dissent in the Pacifica case:219 that some parents might want their
children to hear the “seven dirty words” monologue220 and similar
talk.
On the other hand, Robert Peters emphasized the imperfection
of many parents. I want to specifically ask you, Mr. Peters, given
that situation, and assuming that you can identify what indecency
is, does society have a greater interest than the parents in protecting children from indecency on the Internet?
MR. PETERS: Well, in Ginsberg v. State of New York221 and in
Pacifica,222 the Supreme Court recognized two valid interests regarding children; one was assisting parents,223 and the other was
protecting children.224 This second issue recognizes that, in some

Internet Exchange (“LINX”) formed the Safety-Net Foundation (later renamed the Internet Watch Foundation) to monitor illegal material on the Internet. The ISPA stated that
members would remove illegal material when they are aware of it. See Guy Clapperton,
Net Working on Porn Laws; Guy Clapperton Looks at the Methods Being Used to Screen
Out Online Obscenity, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 9, 1997, at 13.
218. Chief Executive Officer, America Online, Inc. See Case: Summit, Politics Do
Not Mix, MULTIMEDIA DAILY, Dec. 2, 1997.
219. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 770.
221. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
222. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
223. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring).
224. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757-58 (Powell, J., concurring).
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cases, the parent may be the enemy of the child. For example,
where there is sexual abuse and other problems in the home. The
government’s concern cannot be limited to assisting parents, given
the fact that many parents have bigger problems than their children
do.
So I agree that the answer to the parents who do not want to restrict their children’s access to the Internet is to open the door to
them. It is a tough problem, and certainly it is another thing that
came up in Reno.225 The judges were very concerned that the
prosecutors were going to go after good, liberal parents who did
not believe in screening.226 Now, you cannot get prosecutors to go
after organized crime controlled adult obscenity businesses, but
admittedly, in theory, going after good parents could happen. It is
hard for me to believe that any prosecutor in this country, certainly
at this point, would go after an honest, sincere, and loving parent.
But the Court was very concerned about that.
So I suppose the compromise requires some defense for parents
who allow their children access to sites on the Internet which most
parents would not approve of. Hopefully, that defense would not
allow bad parents who use pornography to sexually abuse their
children, but presumably there are other laws that would apply in
those instances.
As part of the compromise we would need this parental defense. Personally, I am very liberal when it comes to parental authority, except in the worst cases. So if you did not want to limit
your child’s access to the Internet, I would not bat an eyelash. I
think that is the answer to the parental conservatives.
MR. STEINHARDT: Let me talk as a parent. Actually, Parry
Aftab and I are about the same age, but my children are younger. I
have a fifteen-year-old and a nine-year-old. My fifteen-year-old is
a sophomore in high school, and gets remarkably difficult home225. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (noting that, even if it were technically feasible to
block minors’ access to newsgroups or chat rooms that contain indecent or offensive material, it would be impossible to allow them access to the remaining, non-indecent content).
226. See id. at 2348 (“Under the [Communications Decency Act], a parent allowing
her 17 year old to use the family computer to obtain information on the Internet that she,
in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term.”).
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work assignments that scare the heck out of me.
My wife and I have made very different choices for our children because of their age differences in terms of their Internet access. Basically, for our fifteen-year-old we get complete Internet
access. I have no doubt this fifteen-year-old is interested in sexual
issues, and I have no doubt that he is clever enough and smart
enough to access sexual material. I encourage him to access material, for example, about safe sex practices. He is probably more
likely to absorb information accurately on-line than he is going to
absorb it from his parents, given his age.
For our nine-year-old, we do subscribe to America Online and
we do use some of the parental controls. But I must tell you that I
do it reluctantly, not so much because I think that parental controls
are a problem as they relate to a nine-year-old, but because the
truth is that I do not think there is a great chance that my nine-yearold is going to be harmed on-line. First of all, she is exposed to
very, very little on-line that she does not go after or that she does
not have some adult help her get to. Second, as I see this parade of
other nine-year-olds come through my home with sprained ankles,
broken arms, and broken wrists, all caused by ice skating or roller
blading, I actually think she is a lot safer on-line. I think that our
medical premiums are reduced by encouraging her to stay on-line,
rather than go out roller blading. I am afraid we are just not that
worried about it when it comes to my still-very-young daughter.
On the other hand, I am worried about my fifteen-year-old. He
is interested in sex; I know that. But I am concerned about the
possibility that he is not going to be able to do his homework if we
employ parental controls. I do not want him blocked from the
Quaker web site or the American Association of University
Women web site. I certainly do not want him blocked from the biology department of Yale University when he is struggling with his
biology homework. The Internet is his primary source of research
now, as it likely is for most of his fellow students.
I am willing to take whatever slight risk there is on the Internet
as a trade for the access that he has to a wealth of information,
which would be otherwise inaccessible to him: information that
certainly was inaccessible to me when I was his age.
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MR. SIMS: Thank you. Were there any questions from the audience?
QUESTION: A question for Mr. Peters. Is the child safety issue a self-curing problem? In time, when the children of this generation become parents, because they will be far more expert than
their parents in regard to the Internet, won’t they have the wherewithal and the knowledge to control their children’s access?
MR. PETERS: Well, I’ll tell you, as the years go by, children
will be able to access the Internet outside of the home more and
more easily. I do not know how any system can depend totally, utterly, solely on parental use of home screening technology. I do
not see how that is going to solve the problem.
Also, in the meantime, until this generation grows up, we will
just throw the children who do not have all-wise parents to the
wolves.
QUESTION: If in fact there are sufficient laws, Mr. Peters, to
already control obscenity and the obscenity standard seems usable,
if not perfectly defined, why bother legislating specifically for cyberspace? The law is there already. If it is obscene, you go after
it. If it is child pornography being sent to children, you go after it.
MR. PETERS: Well, I will tell you one practical problem. We
have not had an obscenity prosecution in Manhattan227 for almost
two decades.228 So if the idea is protecting children by enforcing
the adult obscenity standard, we'll be abandoning many children
who do not have perfect parents.
I shouldn't use the phrase “even in New York,” but I think it is
true that, even in New York City, if it were proved that some adult
book store were selling hard-core porn to children, the prosecutor
would enforce the harmful-to-minors law. But that does not apply
to the Internet.

227. One of New York City’s five boroughs, Manhattan comprises the whole of
New York County.
228. The last successful obscenity prosecution in Manhattan occurred in 1973. See
People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314 (1973). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an
obscenity conviction from the Supreme Court in Bronx County, New York, and the Appellate Division for the First Department in 1980. See People v. Hearne, 415 N.Y.S.2d
625 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 50 N.Y.2d 919 (1980).
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QUESTIONER: Why not?
MR. PETERS: When you are dealing with a harmful-to-minors
law in a medium where you might limit adult access, you have a
First Amendment issue. You do not have that in an adult bookstore because clerks can easily check for identification.
MS. FANTINO: How many do? I bet there is a fifteen-yearold child in Iowa somewhere that is buying Screw magazine or
Hustler magazine. And you are telling me his parents know about
it? Really, if children want to access pornography, they are going
to do it whether they live in some Mormon town or whether they
live in New York City, and they are going to do it whether they
can hold it in their hands or whether they can scan it with a mouse.
MR. PETERS: Well, I tell you, that rationale would say that we
should repeal all laws that protect children against pornography,
and I do not think that is going to happen. I grew up in an area
where there were laws against selling alcohol to minors. Admittedly, those who wanted to get a drink got a drink. But from my
experience, it was pretty much limited to the rebels.
MS. FANTINO: Bob, you never looked at a copy of Penthouse
when you were a child?
MR. PETERS: Penthouse may have been after my time, believe it or not.
MS. FANTINO: No. It is over twenty-five years old.
MR. PETERS: I am forty-nine, so when I was a child it was
not there. Playboy was around. I saw pornography when I was a
child, and in my opinion it did not help me.
MR. KURNIT: It doesn’t seem to have hurt you.
MR. PETERS: I don’t want to get into my personal life, but my
observation on the effects of pornography is that the average person looks at it and pretty much goes on to other things and that is
the end of it. But I think real-world experience will show you that
many people will become addicted to pornography. It usually begins when they are children. That is the reason why we like to
limit children's access.
To some extent, many laws that would help kids are not rigorously enforced. But this does not mean that we should remove
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those laws from the books. I do not see law as the whole answer,
but I am glad it is there to punish the person who knowingly does
what is wrong.
QUESTION: When I was a child, my father absolutely forbid
me from dialing any of those 976 dial-a-porn numbers, and that is
why I did it. How come that analogy does not transcend into the
Internet? If you are a parent and you tell your child not to look at
those type of web sites, isn’t that the parent’s responsibility?
MR. PETERS: Again going back to the real world before the
Internet, every loving, perfect parent would say to her child, “Now,
Johnny or Janine, you are not to go and buy those pornography
publications.” That would have been the end of it. We wouldn’t
have needed any laws that made it unlawful for shop owners to sell
pornography to children. But for some reason our forefathers concluded that perfect parents, instructing their children in an effective
way, would not always provide the protection. So we made it a little harder for children to get pornography; we made it harder for
them to drink under age; we made it harder for them to smoke under age. It’s a tough battle.
The same thing is true of drugs. I think we might need to refine our approach a little bit, but making drugs legal to sell is not
the answer to it.
MR. SIMS: I see that we have a question from one of the Journal editors.
MR. GARNER: I’m Robert Garner, managing editor of the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal. I would like to revisit a much narrower topic mentioned earlier: the Virginia libraries that restrict the content that they accepted from the Internet for their public.229 Why is that viewed as
a problem? Libraries do not have to buy every book that is published, so why is an Internet content restriction not analogous to
the library not buying every book that is sold?
MR. STEINHARDT: It is a very different issue. Librarians
now in the world of books do make content decisions, but they
229. See David Nakamura & Justin Blum, Va. House Takes Page From Black’s
Book, Passes Internet Controls, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at V2.
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make content decisions because they are limited both by physical
space in their library and also by their financial resources. For the
most part, publishers do not give away their materials to libraries.
The Internet is very different, of course. Once libraries pay for
access, they essentially have access to the entire world of information that is on the Internet. The Loudoun County, Virginia case230
involves access limitations not only for minors but also for adults,
and it has been limited by the use of the X-Stop software,231 which
filters to an extraordinary degree and cannot be overridden: even
by adults. That is a case in which I think my side is going to be
victorious. It is a case in which the library is engaging in the worst
kind of content discrimination. The library is prohibiting adults
from accessing material to which they have a constitutional right in
the name of protecting children from material. But the library is
using methodologies that have nothing to do with children, and
which are aimed at adults as well.232
MR. GARNER: Why is the library case not representative of
the distinction between Rust v. Sullivan233 and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia?234 Isn’t the action of
the Virginia public libraries analogous the federal government’s
abortion counseling restriction in Rust? Isn’t the government buying a service, and doesn’t it then have the right to choose what service it is buying or the parameters of the service?
MR. STEINHARDT: I do not think that the government has
the right to engage in content-based discrimination. That is what
230. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudon County Library, No.
Civ. A. 97-2049-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998).
231. See id. at *36-37; see also Sewall Chan, Web Debate at Library on Shelf for
Now; Decision on Limits Pushed to December, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997, at V3 (defining X-Stop as “a software program that blocks specific Web addresses based on [personal] preferences).
232. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *38 (noting that the
governmental interest in protecting children does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech).
233. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that government may make content-based
choices when the government is the speaker or when the government enlists private entities to convey its own message).
234. 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan by drawing a line
between conditions imposed on government-funded private speech and conditions imposed on the government’s own speech or that of its surrogates).
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the government is doing here in an extremely crude way. The odd
thing here is that much of the material blocked by the X-Stop software is available on the library shelves. You can get it in its
printed form. The library cases, which have always turned on the
question of scarce resources in both space and dollars, just do not
apply here because there are no scarce resources.235
And in this case there certainly are less-restrictive alternatives
that the libraries could have taken. For example, they apply this
practice only to minors. Instead, what they have done in the name
of protecting minors applies to adults as well. If they were concerned about passers-by seeing what was on the screens, they
could have put in privacy screens. They could have done any
number of things without engaging in this sort of crude form of filtering.
Another interesting sideline to this is even in Loudoun County,
Virginia, which is in the midst of the Moral Majority country, the
vote on the library board was very close: 5-4 to install the Internet
filtering software.236 So even in that fairly conservative jurisdiction, they saw the peril.
MR. SIMS: I am enjoying this. I would love to continue, but
we are out of time. I want to personally thank our very fine panelists for a stimulating, interesting, and informative panel. I would
also like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for this setting up
this fine program. On behalf of the Journal, I also want to thank
all of you for attending.

235. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *33-35 (noting that
by purchasing Internet access, the library has made all Internet publications accessible to
patrons); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist J., dissenting)
(noting that budgetary concerns force school libraries to choose some books over others).
236. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *2 (naming five of
the library board members as defendants).

